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ASSOCIATION "FOR THE MERETORIOUS PURPOSE
OF ... MUTUAL BENEFIT": A CHRONICLE OF
THE BUILDING AND LOAN INDUSTRY IN
MARYLAND FROM 1852-1961t
By JOHN W. SAUSE, JR.*
The discussion which follows had its inception in the
circumstances surrounding the recent legislation providing
for the regulation and supervision of building and loan
associations in Maryland.' Shortly prior to that time, the
Attorney General had concluded that "it is not altogether
clear what a building and loan [association] is intended
to be in Maryland";2 and if this evaluation be correct,
there is only confusion compounded in the definition pro-
vided by the legislation: "the word 'association' shall mean
t This is the first of two parts. The second part will appear in 22 Mary-
land Law Review 91.
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building, savings and loan or homestead association or any
other similar institution by whatever name called."'
To some degree, the new legislation provides boundaries
for framing a more precise definition of the future opera-
tion of corporations found subject to its provisions. But,
in another and more contemporary sense, the Acts of 1961
are regulatory measures;4 and the avowed purpose of
"promot[ing] and fostering .. .the building, savings and
loan or homestead business,"' absent further definition
of the nature of that business, suggests not so much that
the definition to be reached will be a new one as that it
will, through regulation, reflect the purposes of the already-
existing system. Remedial legislation is best understood
in perspective; and in the case of the recent building and
loan legislation, such understanding is not only desirable
but indispensable to proper evaluation of the effect of such
measures upon the system found in operation. For this
reason, and because the status of the new statutes is cur-
rently in doubt,6 no attempt has been here made to provide
a more detailed examination of the nature and effect of
the new law.
A word of caution to the reader. As used herein, the
words "building and loan association" apply only to the
corporations so nominated which exist under the laws of
the State of Maryland - the so-called old-line or neighbor-
hood associations. To approach this discussion with a pre-
conceived picture based upon the fancy-facade goliaths
existing under Federal charters will be inaccurate and
misleading.
8
MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1961) Art. 23, §§ 160B (a), 161B (a).
'Cf. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1946) § 10.5MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1961) Art. 23, §§ 160A (d), 161A (d).
OPetitions to submit Chapter 205 of the Acts of 1961 to referendum
were filed with the Secretary of State. Thereafter, the legislature, meeting
in special session reenacted the statute in slightly modifted- form as
Chapter 1, Acts of 1961, Special Session. The Attorney General ruled
that the referendum petitions were legally insufficient; and the matter
is currently in litigation. Also before the courts is the question of
whether, if the referendum petitions were adequate, their effect could
be defeated by the enactment of a similar bill at a special session of the
legislature. See, First Continental Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v.
Albert W. Ward, etc., et al., Court of Appeals of Maryland, September
Term, 1961, #344 (on appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County): Freestate Savings & Loan Association, Inc. v. Director, State
Department of Assessments and Taxation, Court of Appeals of Maryland,
September Term, 1961, #355 (on appeal from the Circuit Court for Prince
Georges County) ; James H. Pollack, et al. v. Albert W. Ward, Director,
etc., Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Docket 1961, Folio A549, #A-41783.
Although the result of the Attorney General's ruling with regard to the
insufficiency of the referendum petitions would mean thaJt the bill enacted
at the special session was inoperative (MD. LAWS 1961 (Spec. Sess.) Ch. 1,
§ 3), the State has thus far proceeded only under the terms of that measure,
e.g. no director has been appointed In accordance with §§ 161A et seq.
1962] BUILDING ASSOCIATION HISTORY 3
I. FOLK BANKs OF T=E Mm-N TEIN THCENTURY
Building and loan associations were born in a spirit
of altruism perhaps more indigenous to the Industrial
Revolution than the New Frontier. It has been indicated
that the first such association was formed in 1831 at Side-
botham's Inn in what is now Philadelphia.' But, whatever
their domestic origin, the first Maryland associations were
patterned on the plan of "Benefit Building Societies" first
recognized by the British Parliament in the statute of
6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 32 (1836).8
By 1852, these groups, then only partnerships or joint
ventures, had been established in Maryland; and a bill was
introduced that year in the legislature to permit their in-
corporation. The enthusiasm of its sponsors is reflected
in the preamble:
"Whereas, Divers persons, chieflly amongst the in-
dustrial classes, in various parts of this State, particu-
larly in the city of Baltimore, have associated them-
selves together for the meretorious purpose of ac-
cumulating, by small periodical deposits, a Savings'
Fund, by which they may be enabled to procure for
themselves respectively, a Homestead, and for their
mutual benefit; thus presenting to persons so asso-
ciated, a strong motive or inducement to economy and
frugality, the exercise of which, cannot but promote
their individual welfare, and contribute largely to the
taxable property of the State;
Henry Lee, "Capitalists with the common touch," CORONET MAGAZINE,
Vol. 50, No. 2, December, 1960, pp. 128-132. Some authorities see these
associations as having primeval roots in early Chinese groups. SUNDHEIM,
LAW OF BUILDING & LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (3d ed. 1933) § 1; THORNTON &
BLACKLEDGE, BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (1898) § 1. It has been
thought sufficient here to confine historical references to the English
ancestors.
8 Entitled "An Act for the Regulation of Benefit Building Societies," the
statute referred to the business of such societies as the accumulation
of "a Stock or Fund for the Purpose of enabling each Member . . . to
erect or purchase One or more Dwelling House or . . . Houses, or other
Real or Leasehold Estate to be secured by Way of Mortgage to such
Society .... "
Benefit 'Building Societies, in existence as early as 1780, seem to have
evolved in turn from earlier groups known as "Friendly -Societies" which
were ' organlzed in England in the early days of the industrial revolution
to provide for the mutual and cooperative savings of a few pennies per
week by workingmen and to make small providential loans to their
members for funerals and other extreme emergencies in the family."
RUSSELL, SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (1956) p. 23. See also,
ScnATCrcEy, BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETIES (4th ed. 1868) ; STONE, BENEFIT
BUILDING -SOCIETIES (1851); WURTzEBUG, BUILDING SocIErIEs (5th ed.
1920).
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And whereas, it is the dictate of a sound policy, that
the protection and encouragement of the Legislature,
should be given to associations having in view ends
and objects so commendable in their character.... 9
Apparently this enthusiasm was shared by the legislators,
for the bill passed both Houses with only three dissent-
ing votes and became effective as Chapter 148 of the Acts
of 1852 on May first of that year.' 0
In one respect, the Act of 1852 was purely an incorpora-
tion measure, authorizing citizens of the State "to associate
for the purpose of organising or establishing Homestead
or Building Associations." There being no general incor-
poration law in existence at the time, this portion of Chap-
ter 148 related to purely procedural matters of corporate
birth and existence: the power to adopt and enforce by-
laws; the seal; the number and election of officers; record-
ing the articles of association; the manner of making
charter amendments; and the authority of officers to make
affidavit of the consideration for mortgages. It was also
provided that the corporations "shall be capable in law to
hold and dispose of property, both real and personal. ... ""
Section 10 authorized a merger of associations, formed
prior to the Act, in corporations formed thereunder. An-
other provision (§8) made "members" of such associations
competent witnesses in cases involving the corporation.
The two sections last mentioned, with minor changes in
syntax made in 1868, appear in the present Code." Each
is something of an anachronism and merits no further
attention. Passing notice might be made, however, of the
fact that, by Section 11, the Legislature reserved power
"to alter, amend or repeal this act at pleasure."
Terminating Associations
Like the latter-day Holy Roman Empire, the term
"Building and Loan associations" is (but, unlike the Em-
pire, always was) something more than a misnomer, for
I Preamble MD. LAWS 1852, Ch. 148. A similar reference (to the origins
of the associations ("industrious classes") is made in the British statute.
The Maryland Act came only two years after the first United States
statute passed in Pennsylvania in 1850. SUwDHErm, LAW OF BUILDING &
LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (3d ed. 1933) § 2. SUNDHEIM'S statement that such
associations are "creatures of statute" should not be taken too literally
in view of the recognition of the existence of other associations in
Maryland in the Act of 1852.
10 Journal of the House of Delegates (1852) p. 600; Journal of the
Senate (1852) p. 330.
U MD. LAWS 1852, Ch. 148, §§ 1, 2, 9.
122 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, §§ 151-153.
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these groups were neither engaged in building nor, it was
held, made loans.13 This semantic problem is character-
istic of a difficulty which has pervaded almost every
aspect of the development of these associations; and it is
the cause of most, if not all, of the confusion which
exists today.
The Act of 1852 did much to create the uncertainty,
for other than to make a general reference to the purpose
of the associations contemplated by it, the legislature
merely presupposed their existence as they had evolved in-
dependent of any legislation, authorized the incorporation
of that system, and, in certain areas, sought to regu-
late it. Similar sketchiness was noted in early charters
and by-laws.14
The failure to provide a more particular description of
the system served in many ways to obscure the regulatory
nature of the Act. Before turning to those provisions, it is
therefore necessary to examine the nature of the opera-
tion of the early associations.
The early associations were self-liquidating, or "termi-
nating."' 5 The basic idea was that all of the members sub-
scribed to shares and agreed to pay for them in weekly
installments until their par value was reached. At that
time, the corporation was dissolved.'" Vitality was in-
jected into the system when one of its members wished
to purchase a home, at which time he obtained an amount
13 Even before the passage of the Maryland Act of 1852 it was recog-
nized in Britain that such associations were "really Investing and Bor-
rowing societies ...... STONE, BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETIES (1851) p. 12.
The term "building," which once had significance, was even then obsolete.
STONE, op. cit. supra, pp. 1-12. The term "loan," as applied to Maryland
associations was not appropriate, as will be seen. Undoubtedly, however,
the Constitutional reasons for distinguishing the building and loan
transaction from a "loan" did not exist in Great Britain as they did in
Maryland. Compare 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 32, § II, with Citizens Security & L. Co.
v. Uhler, 48 Md. 455 (1878), as explained by Carozza v. Federal Finance
Co., 149 Md. 223, 244-250, 131 A. 332 (1925). See also, SUNDHEIm, LAW
OF BUILDING AND LOAN AssocIATIoNs (3d ed. 1933) § 6.
"1E.g. Peter's Build. Ass'n v. Jaecksch, 51 Md. 198, 201 (1879); Lister
v. Log Cabin Build. Asso., 38 Md. 115, 118 (1873).
25 This feature probably accounts for -the lack of a provision limiting the
duration of these corporations, although such provisions were common
in this period. Cf. 1 MD. CODE (1888) Art. 23, § 42; BALLANTINE, CoaRo-
nATIoNS (Rev. ed. 1946) § 9; BRUNE, MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW AND
PRAcTIcE (Rev. ed. 1953) § 42. See also Franz v. Teutonia Building
Association, 24 Md. 259 (1866).
1Home Mut. Build. Asso. v. Thursby, 58 Md. 284, 287 (1882); Peter's
Build. Ass'n v. Jaecksch, 51 Md. 198, 202 (1879) ; Low Street Build. Asso.
v. Zucker, 48 Md. 448, 452 (1878); Lister v. Log Cabin Build. Asso., 38
Md. 115, 119 (1873); Robertson v. Am. Homestead Assn., 10 Md. 397,
407 (1857). For early by-law provisions, see Windsor and Applegarth v.
Bandel, et al., 40 Md. 172, 173 (1874); Shannon v. Howard Mut. Build.
As., 36 Md. 383, 388-389 (1872).
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of money from the fund created by the capital contribu-
tions of himself and his fellow-members. This was not
considered a "loan" in the ordinary sense of the word but
rather an "advance" or anticipation of the money which
he would ultimately receive from the shares to which he
had subscribed.17
But, it was felt that after a member had received his
advance the "strong motive or inducement to economy
and frugality" which had prompted his joining the associa-
tion might leave him. Optimists might have viewed this
as too cynical a view, but realists required some security
for the future promise to pay installments on the original
subscription. For this reason, a mortgage was given -
not, of course, to secure a "loan" of money but to insure
payment, by the member receiving the advance, of future
installments which he had agreed to make."8 The member
receiving the advance, in addition to the weekly "dues" to
which he had already subscribed, was usually required to
pay interest on the sum advanced to him.
In characteristically lucid style, Judge Alvey sum-
marized the system in 1878:
"[T]he contract, as between the Association and
the shareholder receiving the advance, assumes this
form: - The Association proposes to sell to the share-
holder the right of presently receiving the fixed value
of the shares, upon being allowed a certain deduction
from the amount, commonly called a bonus [but in
the parlance of the Act of 1852, a 'premium'], it
being, in fact, a deduction made at the time, and the
shares thus discounted or redeemed are to be paid for
by the continuance of the subscription and payment
of weekly dues, and fines, if any incurred, until the
required amount shall be raised to pay each unre-
deemed shareholder the fixed value of his shares in
17Waverly Mut. Build. Asso. v. Buck, 64 Md. 338, 345 (1885); Low
Street Build. Asso. v. Zucker, id., 452; Williar v. Loan Ass'n, 45 Md. 546,
562 (1877) ; Robertson v. Am. Homestead Asso., id., 411. Cf. Lister v.
Log Cabin Build. Asso., id., 118.
Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, 186 Md. 569, 578, 47 A. 2d 769,
(1946); Faust v. Building Association, 84 Md. 186, 35 A. 890 (1896);
Low Street Build. Asso. v. Zucker, 8upra, n. 16, 452; McCahan v.
Columbian Build. Asso. of East Balt., No. 2, 40 Md. 226, 238 (1874);
Williar v. Loan Ass'n, id., 562; Shannon v. Howard Mut. Build. Asn., 36
Md. 383, 394 (1872) ; Robertson v. Am. Homestead Assn., supra, n. 16, 411.
Cf. Lister v. Log Cabin Build. Asso., supra, n. 16, 119. For the form of
these mortgages, see e.g., Low Street Build. Asso. v. Zucker, supra, n. 16,
450; McCahan v. Columbian Build. Asso. of East Balt. No. 2, supra,
pp. 230-231; Shannon v. Howard Mut. Build. As., 8upra, pp. 384-385;
Robertson v. Am. Homestead Assn., supra, n. 16, 399, 406.
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full.... Thus it is that the weekly payments con-
stituted the purchase money which the shareholder is
required to pay for what he has received in advance,
or in anticipation of the time for the redemption of
all the shares; and it is for the security and ultimate
payment of these weekly dues and fines that the mort-
gage is given. The supposed benefit of the contract to
the mortgagor consists mainly of the length of time
and gradual manner in which payments are required
to be made. He is not in the position of an ordinary
borrower of money; he remains a member of the Asso-
ciation, subject to its constitution and by-laws; and
in taking the advance on his shares, he is only allowed
to anticipate, for a premium or bonus, the final re-
demption of all the shares when the funds realized
may be sufficient to pay on each unredeemed share
[its par value] . . . over and above all losses."'19
The profits from this "advance" transaction enhanced
the value of the stock and thus operated to discharge the
mortgagor-member's obligation by advancing the time at
which the association would be terminated. 0 Gradually,
with the interest payments of borrowing members and
the weekly dues of all the members, the cash value of
each share of unadvanced stock reached the predetermined
par value. At this point, the association ceased to exist;
and all mortgages, whether the amount advanced had
been paid in full or not, were released.2 ' Members who
had not received advances were entitled to any surplus:
"When an adequate amount has been regularly ac-
cumulated to satisfy the claims of the deferred share-
holders, [they] . . . will be authorized to have their
acquittance money, and to divide the surplus profits -
the prepaid members, will then also be released from
their mortgages.
"When such objects have been effected, the Associa-
tion, having completed its mission, terminates."2
"Low Street Build. Asso. v. Zucker, 8upra, n. 16, 452-453. For other
descriptions of the Terminating association, see the texts cited in foot-
note 74, infra.
20 Home Mut. Build. Asso. v. Thursby, 58 Md. 284, 287 (1882) ; Lister
v. Log Cabin Build Asso., supra, n. 16, 121. Of. Waverly Mut. Build. Asso.
v. Buck, 64 Md. 338, 344, 345 (1885).
2Peter's Build. Ass'n v. Jaecksch, 51 Md. 198, 202 (1879) ; Lister v. Log
Cabin Build. Asso., supra, n. 16, 121.
2 Lister v. Log Cabin Build. Asso., supra, n. 16, 122. To the same effect
is Windsor v. Bandel, 40 Md. 172 (1874).
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Regulatory Features of the Act of 1852
But, there were inherent in the plan six features which,
while indispensable to the operation of these associations,
could easily become vehicles of oppression to unwary mem-
bers, particularly the uneducated classes among which
they traditionally operated. Although the Act of 1852, un-
like its English parent, did not style itself a regulatory
act, its effect, as interpreted by the Court of Appeals, was
no more than to check these potential abuses.
1. Entrance fees.
The character of these associations made small over-
head particularly desirable; and so small a matter as estab-
lishing the account of an entering member could, especially
in the early days of the association, be a costly matter.
Furthermore, it was, and is, not unusual to make a one-
time, special charge against new members of any mutual-
type organization.
Section 3 of the Act of 1852 therefore conferred the
power upon corporate building and loan associations "in
their articles of association . . . to prescribe the entrance
fee to be paid by each stockholder at the time of sub-
scribing .... ,23 This prohibited the charging of entrance
fees to borrowing members only; and also required that
the fee have the added stability derived from incorpora-
tion in the charter rather than merely the by-laws.24
2. Bonus.
If a person were to become a member after the associa-
tion had been in operation for a period of time, he would
obviously derive an unfair advantage from the accumula-
tion of dues already paid in by the other members. For
example, if a new member should enter an association
after it had been operating for two years and it thereafter
continued for another three years, at which time all of
the unredeemed shareholders were paid in full and the
organization liquidated, he would derive the same benefit
from payment of dues for three years as those who had
made weekly payments of the same amount for the full
term.
23MD. LAWS 1852, Ch. 148, § 3. Cf. 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 144 (b).
2 Ehrhart v. Bldg. & Loan Assn., 157 Md. 40, 43, 145 A. 202, (1929);
Stewart v. Building Association, 106 Md. 675, 683, 68 A. 887, (1907).
For an early provision see Morrison v. Dorsey, 48 Md. 461, 470 (1878).
[VOL. XXII
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Thus, Section 5 of the Act of 1852 made "provision for
equalization of members, that they may share equally the
profits of the concern" :15
"Any person applying for membership, or for stock
in any such corporation, after the end of one month
from the time of incorporation, may be required to
pay, on subscribing, such bonus or assessment as may
from time to time be fixed or assessed, in such manner
as may be provided by the corporation, in order to
place such new member or stockholder on a footing
with the original members and others holding stock
at the time of such application."26
The limit of any bonus or assessment which might be
charged was thus fixed by statute and readily ascertain-
able at the time that the new member entered. It was,
as so defined, nothing more than "back dues.
2 7
3. Fines and forfeitures.
As the Court of Appeals observed in an early case:
"From the character of . . . building associations,
the imposition of adequate fines, as agreed upon by
the by-laws, is justified in order to prevent default in
the punctual payment of the weekly dues, upon which
the success of the company depends; or in case of de-
fault, that some reasonable equivalent for the conse-
quent damage sustained, may be provided.
'2 8
Section 4 of the Act of 1852 conferred power "to en-
force the payment of all instalments, and other dues ...
by... fines and forfeitures .... "29 Although the provision
Geiger v. German Build. Asso., 58 Md. 569, 574 (1882).
MD. LAWS 1852, Ch. 148, § 5. The provision, with only slight changes
in syntax made in 1868, now appears as 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 147.
"7 White v. Williams, 90 Md. 719, 728, 45 A. 1001 (1900); Geiger v.
German Build. Asso., supra, n. 25, 574; Home Mut. Build. Asso. v. Thursby,
58 Md. 284, 287 (1882); McCahan v. Columbian Build. Asso., 40 Md. 226,
233 (1874). It must be remembered that there was a clear distinction
between a "bonus" and a "premium." White v. Williams, supra, 724, 728;
Geiger v. German Build. Asso., supra, pp. 574; McCahan v. Columbian
Build. Asso., 8upra, pp. 233. A '%onus" was also different from a pre-
release fee, which was sometimes called by the same name; e.g. Oak
Cottage Bldg. Assn. v. Eastman, 31 Md. 556, 560 (1869).
11 Shannon v. Howard Mut. Build. As., 36 Md. 383, 393 (1872). The Court
referred to such fines as "in the nature of liquidated damages." It was
somewhat extraordinary for equity courts to enforce such payments. Cf.
Superior Construction Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. 1, 14, 102 A. 2d 739 (1954).
"2 MD. LAWS 1852, Ch. 148, § 4. The provision, with only slight changes
in syntax, now appears as 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 146.
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did leave the actual amount somewhat to the discretion
of the individual association, there was some regularity
achieved by requiring that the amount be fixed in the
charter or by-laws rather than by the action of the govern-
ing body of the association in individual cases. The Court
of Appeals adopted a rule of strict construction:
"These associations [cautioned Judge Alvey] should
not expect of the courts, and especially Courts of
Equity, to indulge the severest construction of their
by-laws, in reference to fines and forfeitures, that
can be suggested; particularly where it can be seen
that such construction would operate with harshness
and oppression upon the party in default." 0
4. Premium.
The matter of receiving advances of money with which
to purchase homes was of course one of the dominant pur-
poses of the early associations. Indeed, there was some
jockeying for position among the members as to the order
in which the funds were to be distributed as they became
available,31 which was very slow indeed.32 An association
usually received no more than 25¢ on a share each week;
and when sufficient funds had been accumulated to make
an advance, the process began all over again. The matter
was usually resolved by conducting a sort of auction among
the members. As contained in the charter of one early
association, "When the funds on hand, of this association,
are sufficient to redeem one or more shares of its stock,
said funds shall be offered to redeem that holder's share
who offers to receive the lowest sum therefor."3 Another
association made advances to "[tlhe member who will pay
the longest interest in advance. ... "
w Montl. Perm. Build. Soc. v. Lewin, 38 Md. 445, 449 (1873). See also,
Stewart v. Building Association, 106 Md. 675, 683, 68 A. 887 (1907);
Shannon v. Howard 'Mut. ,Build. Assn., 36 Md. 383, 396 (1872). Cf. Pentz
v. Citizens Fire Ins., etc., Co., 35 Md. 73, 80 (1872).
81 The Court of Appeals observed in one case that the members con-
sidered the receipt of an advance "a valuable privilege." Lister v. Log
Cabin Build. Asso., 38 Md. 115, 118 (1873). Cf. Poole v. Miller, 211 Md.
448, 128 A. 2d 607 (1957). There is an excellent discussion of the historical
basis for the premium in Coltrane v. Baltimore Building & Loan Ass'n,
110 F. 293, 302-303.
Cf. Hampstead Build. Asso. v. King, 58 Md. 279, 281 (1882).
Windsor v. Bandel, 40 Md. 172, 173 (1874).
Oak Cottage Bldg. Assn. v. Eastman, 31 Md. 556, 558 (1869). Some
associations more pessimistically required the taking of loans if there
were no bidders, but this seems to have been exceptional in Maryland. Cf.
Geiger v. German Build. Asso., 58 Md. 569, 572 (1882).
[VOL. XXII
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Section 6 of the Act of 1852 expressly recognized this
method of choosing those who would receive advances:
"Such corporation... [may] advance to any mem-
ber thereof, for such premium as may be agreed upon,
the sum which he would be entitled to receive, upon
the dissolution of the corporation for any number of
shares therein held, or [may] purchase from any
member thereof, the share or... shares, of stock held
by him, at such price or sum as, according to the
articles of association, such member may agree to
receive ... ",5
Although it was argued that this provision "recognizes
two classes of Building Associations, one of which may
charge a premium, and the other may buy the shares at
a discount,"8 it was ultimately held that the provision
merely referred to the same sort of transaction. As thus
interpreted, the statute placed four restrictions on the
premium which might be charged: (a) it must reflect
"an equitable and profitable method of selecting its bor-
rowers;" s (b) it must be a fixed amount;89 (c) it must
MMD. LAWS 1852, Ch. 148, § 6. Amended in 1894 as hereafter noted,
the provision now appears as 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 149.
8 Pentz v. Citizens' Fire Ins., etc., Co., 35 Md. 73, 78 (1872). The
argument quoted in the text was not passed upon by the Court. See also
Birmingham v. Md. Homestead Asso., 45 Md. 541 (1877).
"White v. Williams, 90 Md. 719, 45 A. 1001 (1900) ; Geiger v. German
Build. Asso., 58 Md. 569, 574 (1882). Of. Birmingham v. Md. Homestead
Asso., ibid. The clause relating to the "purchase" of shares was added
as an amendment to the bill as originally introduced. Journal of the
House of Delegates (1852) p. 600. It may have been intended to cover
either or both of two situations: First, to confer the right to allow a free
share member to withdraw prior to the termination of the association.
Of. Hampstead Build. Asso. v. King, 58 Md. 279 (1882). Such a right
could not be exercised in the absence of specific authority. Cf. BRUilNE,
MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW AND PRAC'ICE (Rev. ed. 1953) § 49, p. 54.
Compare 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 32. Second, the clause might also
have been designed to permit the transactions of "Permanent" associations
as they had evolved under -the British statute. See pages 24, 26-27, infra,
and n. 101. In view of the fact that § 7 of the Act of 1852 referred to
n ortgages securing future payments on "shares so purchased or redeemed,"
it seems likely that the second suggestion provided the dominant motive.
The matter is discussed more fully later; and it is sufficient to note at this
point that, as interpreted by the Court of Appeals, the word "or" as used
in the portion of § 6 of the Act of 1852 quoted above was conjunctive.
8 White v. Williams, id., 728. See also Coltrane v. Baltimore Building
& Loan Ass'n, 110 F. 293, 296-308 (C.C.D. Md. 1901), aff'd as to this
point, Coltrane v. 'Blake, 113 F. 785 (4th Cir. 1902). Cf. Geiger v. German
Build. Asso., 58 Md. 569, 573 (1882) ; Peter's Build. Ass'n v. Jaecksch, 51
Md. 198, 204 (1879).
'*Washington Bldg. Assn. v. Andrews, 95 Md. 696, 701, 53 A. 573(1902) ; White v. Williams, mpra, n. 37, 725. See also Coltrane v. Balti-
more Building & Loan Ass'n, id., and Coltrane v. Blake, id.
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be deducted from the par value of the shares;40 (d) interest
could not be charged on the premium.4 Apart from the
statute, however, there seems to be no reason why a
premium might not be charged in any form.42
5. Form of obligation.
As already noted, after a member had received an ad-
vance, the associations required some security for the
fulfillment of his promise to pay future installments of
dues. The receipt of an advance did not change the basic
nature of his agreement with the association; 43 and the
security which he gave was not, as in an ordinary trans-
action, to secure the repayment of the principal advanced
to him but to insure his continued performance of the
original contract to pay dues until the maturity of the
association.
Two aspects of these security obligations made them
somewhat antithetical to traditional mortgage principles.
First, even if the association operated successfully, it was
difficult to predict the length of time which would be
necessary to accumulate sufficient cash to terminate the
association.4 4 Further, although most of the associations
made provision for the release of the mortgage upon repay-
ment of the amount advanced, 45 without such provision
payments might still be required beyond that time if there
were not sufficient capital on hand to repay all of the mem-
," White v. Williams, 8upra, n. 37, 725; Geiger v. German Build. Asso.,
supra, n. 38, 573-574. Of. Birmingham v. Md. Homestead Asso., 45 Md.
541 (1877). See also Pentz v. Citizens' Fire Ins., etc., Co., 35 Md. 73,
78 (1872).
"Balt. Perm. B. & L. Soc. v. Taylor, 41 Md. 409 (1875). The associa-
tion was incorporated under special act but treated as a building and
loan association. See also Coltrane v. Baltimore Building & Loan Ass'n,
supra, n. 38, and Coltrane v. Blake, supra, n. 38.
12Cf. Coltrane v. Baltimore Building & Loan Ass'n, supra, n. 38;
Ooltrane v. Blake, aupra, n. 38; White v. Williams, supra, n. 37. It is
important to keep in mind the distinction between a "premium" and a
"bonus" as those terms are used in the Act of 1852. See footnote 27, supra.
" Coltrane v. Blake, supra, n. 38, reversing Coltrane v. Baltimore Build-
ing & Loan Ass'n, 110 F. 293, 312-319 (C.C.D. Md. 1901), and reinstating
the report of the Master at pp. 293-312. Although this factor is implicit in
the Maryland cases [Murphy v. Preston, 107 Md. 444, 69 A. 114 (1908)],
the State courts reached a different conclusion from the Fourth Circuit
as to the effect which this had upon the obligation of a borrower upon
an involuntary dissolution of the association.
"McCahan v. Columbian Build. Asso., 40 Md. 226, 237 (1874); Shannon
v. Howard Mut. Build. As., 36 Md. 383 (1872); Robertson v. Am. Home-
stead Assn., 10 Md. 397 (1857).
"E.g. Home Mut. Build. Asso. v. Thursby, 58 Md. 284, 289 (1882);
McCahan v. Columbian Build. Asso., id., 237; Windsor v. Bandel, 40 Md.
172, 175 (1874) ; Lister v. Log Cabin Build. Asso., 38 Md. 115, 119 (1873) ;
Shannon v. Howard Mut. Build. As., 36 Md. 383, 391, 396 (1872); Oak
Cottage Bldg. Assn. v. Eastman, 31 Md. 556, 558 (1869).
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bers who had not received advances on their shares."
Thus, neither the duration of the mortgage, nor the total
sum which the borrowing member would be obligated to
repay, were fixed, definite or certain.
Secondly, since the money advanced came from a com-
mon fund, in which the recipient had as much interest as
another member with the same number of shares, the
transaction was not a "loan" and, a fortiori, the laws of
usury did not apply. As observed by the Court of Appeals,
the transaction "was not a loan of money but a dealing
with a partnership fund, in which the person to whom
money was advanced had an interest in common with the
other members of the * * * association. 4 7 Absent a statute,
the rate of interest could be any amount fixed by the asso-
ciation and the member." In fact, what was uniformly
referred to as "interest," not having the same basis as that
form of charge, was really a sort of service charge.49
In the first instance, the Act of 1852 served to authorize
mortgages to secure the terms of building and loan asso-
ciation "advances;" and, in the case of interest, it operated
to limit the rate which might be charged. Section 7 pro-
vided, inter alia, that after an advance to a member:
"[T] he payment of the unpaid instalments... on the
share or shares so purchased or redeemed, with in-
terest . . . on the money paid therefore . . . and all
fines and penalties incurred in respect thereof, by
any ... member, shall be secured to such corporation
by mortgage on real or leasehold property, or by the
hypothecation of stock of such corporation, held by
such member .... ,0
"Hampstead Build. Asso. v. King, 58 Md. 279, 280 (1882); Peter's
Build. Ass'n v. Jaecksch, 51 Md. 198, 202 (1879); Lister v. Log Cabin
Build. Asso., id., 122. In this context, capital meant cash. Low Street
Build. Asso. v. Zucker, 48 Md. 448, 455 (1878).
"'Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, 186 Md. 569, 578, 47 A. 2d 769
(1946) ; Carozza v. Federal Finance Co., 149 Md. 223, 246, 131 A. 332 (1925).
Cf. WiUiar v. Loan Ass'n, 45 Md. 546, 562 (1877) ; Robertson v. Am. Home-
stead Asso., 10 Md. 397, 411 (1857).
1Cf. Commercial Ass'n v. Mackenzie, 85 Md. 132, 143, 36 A. 754 (1897).
"Cf. Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, 8upra, n. 47, 571, where the
mortgage involved refers to "interest or compensation."
SoMD. LAws 1852, Ch. 148, § 7. As substantially expanded, the section
now appears as 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 150. With regard to cases
where stock, instead of property, was to be pledged, there was the further
limitation that "no greater sum of money shall . . . be drawn out by any
member than shall have been already paid in by him on all his shares, at
the time of such hypothecation .... ." The hypothecation referred to in
the statute is to be distinguished from another transaction of the same
name in which a member pledged his shares as security for the debt
of another. See Lumber Co. v. Bldg. & Savings Assn., 176 Md. 403, 5 A.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXII
Similarly, Section 6 of the Act provided that the associa-
tion might receive "security for the payment by such mem-
ber to such corporation of the unpaid instalments to be
paid on the share or shares so sold or redeemed" but added
a limitation upon the rate of interest:
"together with interest, at the rate of six per centum
per annum, on the sum. .. so paid or advanced.. .. ""
Even as so limited, the rate of interest was exceedingly
liberal. For instance, after half of the amount advanced
had been repaid, the borrower, still paying interest of
6% on "the sum so paid or advanced," was in effect paying
interest at the rate of 12% on the money which he had
received and not repaid.2
In the first case to reach the Court of Appeals following
the passage of the Act, it was held that (i) the indefinite-
ness of time and the principal amount due were not objec-
tionable in building and loan association mortgages and
(ii) interest could be charged in the manner prescribed
by the statute. It was there concluded that:
"We have carefully considered the question of the
legal operation and effect of mortgages to 'building
associations,' such as are contemplated and provided
for by the Act of 1852, and have no hesitation in pro-
nouncing them, if executed in conformity with the
provisions of that Act, free from all objection on the
ground of usury. '58
6. Mutuality.
The plan of the early terminating associations was
clearly of a mutual type. All members were required to
pay weekly dues, and if delinquent, fines. 4 Of course, only
2d 458 (1939); Savings & Loan Assn. v. Fedder, 175 Md. 127, 1.99 A.
785 (1938); Frederick v. Lyons, 173 Md. 95, 194 A. 815 (1937).
It was also customary for building and loan association mortgages
to contain covenants to pay taxes and keep the mortgaged premises in-
sured. E.g. Watson v. Loan & Savings Assn., 158 Md. 339, 343, 148 A.
420 (1930) ; White v. Williams, 90 Md. 719, 721, 45 A. 1001 (1900) ; Geiger
v. German Build. Asso., 58 Md. 569, 571 (1882); McCahan v. Columbian
Build. Asso., 40 Md. 226, 231 (1874). Such covenants were enforceable.
Gustav Adolph Build. Asso. v. Kratz, 55 Md. 394, 397 (1881).
51 MD. LAWS 1852, Ch. 148, § 6. As expanded, the section now appears
as 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 149.
5 Even this is purely hypothetical, since it was not known how much
longer the borrowing member would be required to pay dues and interest
before the termination of the association.
51 Robertson v. Am. Homestead Assn., 10 Md. 397, 411 (1857). See also,
Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, 186 Md. 569, 575, 47 A. 2d 769 (1946).
"
4Peter's Build. Ass'n v. Jaecksch, 51 Md. 198 (1879); Lister v. Log
Cabin Build. Asso., 38 Md. 115, 119 (1873).
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borrowing members were required to pay interest; but
it was not consistent with early theories that they pay
other, or higher, dues than the members who had not re-
ceived an advance.5 5 As they met each week, the duties
of the members were practically identical whether or not
they had received an advance; and the interest of each in
the success of the association was inseparable.
However, the term "redeemed" shareholders early came
to be applied to those who had received an advance, i.e.,
had anticipated the full par value of the shares to which
they had subscribed. The appellation, as noted by the
Court of Appeals, was somewhat unfortunate, since it im-
plied more of a termination of membership than was
actually the case.5" A "redeemed" shareholder was none-
theless a member, and had a joint interest in the associa-
tion;5 7 and it is perhaps helpful to confine any adjective
which might be applied to a member receiving an advance,
to his share interest rather than his membership interest."
Even this distinction is not completely accurate, since the
"redeemed" shareholder still shared in the profits of the
association in the sense that, as the assocaition prospered,
the day for the release of his obligation was advanced.59
The only way in which his status actually differed from
that of the unredeemed, or "free" shareholder ° was that,
since he had anticipated the full value of his shares, he
waived all right to participate in any surplus which might
exist at the maturity of the association.8 An early case
described the rights of the members inter se:
"[As] we understand the relative position of the two
classes of members, they might perhaps be better
designated as the 'advanced,' or prepaid, and the 'de-
s A result maintained by the Act. Lister v. Log Cabin Build. Asso., id.,
120. Cf. Morrison v. Dorsey, 48 Md. 461 (1878).
Lister v. Log Cabin Build. Asso., id.
6" Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, supra, n. 53; Williar v. Loan Ass'n,
45 Md. 546, 562 (1877); McCahan v. Columbian Build. Asso. of East
Balto., No. 2; 40 Md. 226, 236 (1874) ; Lister v. Log Cabin Build. Asso.,
supra, n. 54, 120.
18 It is somewhat surprising that these corporations developed along
the lines of a stock corporation, since they always more closely resembled
a non-stock corporation. Compare, e.g., 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 135
with § 158.
Geiger v. German Build. Asso., 58 Md. 569, 574 (1882); Home Mut.
Build. Asso. v. Thursby, 58 Md. 284, 287 (1882); Lister v. Log Cabin
Build. Asso., 8upra, n. 54, 120.
10 Free shareholders were defined simply as "subscribers to . . . capital
stock, who were not borrowers from the association . " Steinberger v.
Savings Asso., 84 Md. 625, 634, 86 A. 439 (1897).
1 Windsor and Applegarth v. Bandel, 40 Md. 172, 177 (1874); Lister v.
Log Cabin Build. Asso., 38 Md. 115, 118, 120 (1873). Cf. Shannon v.
Howard Mut. Build. As., 36 Md. 383, 388 (1872).
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ferred,' or unpaid shareholders. They are all continu-
ing members, however classified, until the Associa-
tion is determined, unless they cease to be so, in pur-
suance of the Articles.
"The advanced or 'prepaid' members are obliged to
pay the interest on the money advanced, besides their
weekly dues - they have not ceased to be members,
by the prepayment, but continue to hold an interest
in the management and success of the Association, as
upon that depends their earlier relief, not only from
the payment of weekly dues, but their final release
from their mortgages.
"The unpaid members are not absolved from the
punctual payment of their weekly dues. They are en-
titled to any residuum of profits, the exclusive in-
terest in which has been devolved upon them, by vir-
tue of the contract, with the prepaid members, through
the act of the company, furnishing the equivalent
consideration.
"Both are interested, and under mutual obligation
to contribute to the accumulation of the common fund,
by the payment of their weekly dues, until the time
provided for its final distributioli and settlement."62
A complete termination of the membership status of
one receiving an advance on his shares could be effected
in only four ways: (a) when the association reached ma-
turity through being able to pay all of its free share-
holders at least the full par value of their shares; (b) by
some default in the association;63 (c) by his default in
meeting his obligation,64 in which case his membership in
the association was foreclosed along with his interest in
the secured property;65 or (d) where the by-laws so pro-
0 Lister v. Log Cabin Build. Asso., id., 119-120. See also Murphy v.
Preston, 107 Md. 444, 69 A. 114 (1908).
" 'Preston v. Woodland, 104 Md. 642, 65 A. 336 (1906); Waverly Mut.
Build. Asso. v. Buck, 64 Md. 338 (1885); Hampstead Build. Asso. v. King,
58 Md. 279 (1882); Peter's Build. Ass'n v. Jaecksch, 51 Md. 198, 202
(1879) ; Low Street Build. Asso. v. Zucker, 48 Md. 448, 452-453 (1878) ;
Windsor and Applegarth v. Bandel, 40 Md. 172, 176 (1874). The Fourth
Circuit disagreed with the formula adopted by the Court of Appeals for
determining the obligation of a borrowing member upon involuntary
dissolution. Coltrane v. Blake, 113 F. 785 (4th Cir. 1902).
"IMcCahan v. Columbian Build. Asso., 40 Md. 226, 237 (1874);
Shannon v. Howard Mut. Build. As., 36 Md. 383, 394 (1872) ; Robertson
v. Am. Homestead Assn., 10 Md. 397 (1857).
f McCahan v. Columbian Build. Asso., ibid; Shannon v. Howard Mut.
Build. As., ibid.
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vided, the repayment of the amount of his advance, with
interest.6
Although there was no specific requirement in the Act
that building and loan associations be of a mutual type,
its provisions served to insure such organization. To be
sure, the conferral of the right to secure, by mortgage,
the payment of an indefinite principal amount, for an in-
definite term, and the payment of fines and forfeitures
probably would not have existed in the absence of statute.
67
However, to accept the basic theory of building associa-
tions, and therefore to legalize these mortgage features, is
not necessarily to provide for any restraints upon that
system. The British statute, for instance, legalized the
transaction without providing any such restrictions with
regard to interest." In that sense, the Maryland Act of
1852 was a regulatory measure.
The regulatory character of the Act can clearly be seen
as it operated to thwart attempts to change the basic sys-
tem, primarily through ill-disguised efforts to exact charges
beyond that specified in the statute. Because of those pro-
visions, the devices necessary to the successful operation
of the system - dues,69 entrance fees, 7° bonuses,71 prem-
iums, 72 and fines73 - retained their traditional forms. In
short, complete mutuality was preserved because any at-
tempt to expand the traditional scope of these devices,
being in conflict with the implications of the statute, par-
ticularly with regard to interest, was held to be futile.
74
See the cases cited supra, n. 45.
Cf. Magness v. Loyola Sav. & L. Ass'n, 186 Md. 569, 575, 47 A. 2d
769, (1946) ; McCahan v. Columbian Build. Asso., 40 Md. 226, 238 (1874) ;
Windsor 'and Applegarth v. Bandel, 40 Md. 172 (1874) ; Shannon v. Howard
Mut. Build. As., 36 Md. 383, 394 (1872) ; Franz v. Teutonia Build. Asso.,
24 Md. 259, 270 (1866) and supra, n. 28.
16 & 7 Will. 4, c. 32, § II, provided in part:
[I]t shall and may be lawful to and for any such Society to have and
receive from any Member or Members thereof -any Sum or Sums of
Money, by way of Bonus on any Share or Shares, for the Privilege of
receiving the same in advance prior ,to the same being realized, -and
also any Interest for the Share or Shares so received or any Part
thereof, without being subject or liable on account thereof to any
of the Forfeitures or Penalties imposed by any Act or Acts of Parlia-
ment relating to Usury." See also 8upra, n. 13.
Peter's Build. Ass'n v. Jaecksch, 51 Md. 198 (1879).
0Ehrhart v. Bldg. & Loan Assn., 157 Md. 40, 145 A. 202 (1929);
Stewart v. Building Association, 106 Md. 675, 683, 68 A. 887, (1907).
71 See cases cited supra, n. 27.
" See cases cited 8upra, ns. 39-42.
7See cases cited supra, ns. 28, 30.
1, Washington 'Bldg. Assn. v. Andrews, 95 Md. 696, 53 A. 513 (1902). Only
in one case is the Act of 1852 seen as a regulatory Act. Coltrane v. Blake,
113 F. 785, 788 (4th Cir. 1902). Probably the failure to more clearly define
the Act as a regulatory measure, as was done in Great Britain, was due to
a nineteenth Century distaste for imposing restrictions upon business.
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II. GILDING THE LILY
Although the Terminating association took root and
flourished in Maryland and elsewhere, its operation, in
addition to being delicately balanced, had definite short-
comings. The fountain of all difficulty was the feature of
automatic termination - in theory the goal, but in practice
the paradox, of the early associations. The problem was
variously stated, and its components are confusingly inter-
related; but all discussion centered around three aspects
of the system: the bonus, the uncertainty of duration of
the association, and the premium.m
The problem of most practical concern to the associa-
tions resulted from the bonus or back dues which were
required from persons who became members after the
beginning of corporate operation. 6 The difficulty involved
no particular feeling of compassion for those obliged to
pay the charge, but rather its stagnating effect upon the
fulfillment of the association's objectives. Every year of
corporate life increased the bonus which the association
would be obliged to charge new members; and eventually
a point was reached when prospective borrowers would
look to younger associations in which this expense would
not be so great. When that occurred, the association would
cease to grow;77 and its operation would thereafter be con-
fined to accumulating the cash fund with which to mature
its unredeemed shares.
The Act of 1852 did not, of course, make it mandatory that building and
loan associations incorporate. 'But ithe advantages of incorporation, coupled
with the exemptions from the mortgage laws conferred upon such corpo-
rations, was tempting; and once the association had subjected itself to
the law, it was subject to all of its provisions.
For other descriptions of the Terminating association, see ENDLICH,
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (2d ed. 1895) §§ 18-20, (lst ed. 1882) §§
41-43; RussELL, SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (1956) pp. 23-24; SUND-
HE M, LAW OF BUILDING & LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (3d ed. 1933) § 11; THOMP-
SON, BUILDING AND LOAI ASSOCIATIONS (2d ed. 1899) §§ 4-5; THORNTON &
BLACKLEDGE, BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (1898) § 7.
The discussion immediately following is a synthesis of the criticism of
the Terminating plan as seen in varying degree by the following writers:
DAVIS, BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETIES (1887) pp. 15-24; ENDLICH, BUILDING
AssocATioNs (1882) § 46, (2d ed. 1895) § 2.3; SCRATCHLEY, BENEFIT
BUILDING SOCIETUIS (4th ed. 1868) pp. 28-36; STONE, BENEFIT BUILDING
SocrrIEs, (1851) pp. 12-16; SUNDHMM, BUILDING AND LOAN AssociATIoNs
(3d ed. 1933) § 11; THOMPSON, BUILDING ASSOCIATIONS (2d ed. 1899)
§ 6; THORNTON & BLAoKLEDGE, BUILDING AND LOAN AssOCIATiONS (1898)
§7.
" See page 8, supra.
"In defense of the Terminating plan, it must be noted that if all mem-
bers of the association desired to receive loans, the problem would not
arise. All members were not, however, prospective borrowers.
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This position was particularly precarious, for without
any opportunity for expansion, the future operation of the
association was determined by factors entirely beyond its
control. First and foremost, the extent of profit to be de-
rived thereafter depended upon the ratio between the re-
deemed and unredeemed shares. If the former number
were small, the unredeemed shareholders would be de-
riving little benefit from the continuance of the associa-
tion. Furthermore, the system made no provision for oper-
ating expenses or for losses; and, while the effect was not
so pronounced when the association was expanding, these
charges when offset against the now-fixed income of the
association only slowed the process of maturing the unre-
deemed shares. The two solutions which were provided to
overcome the effect of this impasse - forced loans and
agreements for premature termination of the society -
were satisfactory to no one.78
The inability to foresee the extent of the effect of the
so-called "bonus impasse," or even the extent of losses or
expenses during the life of the association, produced a
second and independent difficulty. The situation is suc-
cintly stated by a British observer:
"[N]o society can possibly possess, at the end of the
originally specified time, sufficient funds to give to
each Investor the full amount of his shares . . .un-
less: - Throughout the whole previous duration of
the association, there has been no loss sustained, either
through bad investments or other causes, or from ex-
traneous expenses (not covered by sufficient extra con-
tributions from each member over and above the re-
ceipts from fines, fees, &c.), and also unless no month
has ever passed during which any part of the sub-
scriptions has remained unproductive, so that, in other
words, no loss of interest has at any time occurred."7 9
Because of these factors, it was never possible to do more
than approximate the duration of the obligation of either
the borrower" or the investor."'
Thirdly, the accumulation of a large amount of unin-
vested (and uninvestible) capital in the latter years of an
association could only have been considered as presenting
Cf. Hampstead Building Asso., No. 11 v. King, 58 Md. 279 (1882);
SCRATCHLEY, BENEFIT BuILDING SOCIETIES (4th ed. 1868) 28-29, 35.
79 SCRATCHLEY, Op. cit. supra, n. 78, 32. (Emphasis omitted.)
10 Cf. McCahan v. Columbian Build. Asso., 40 Md. 226 (1874) ; Shannon
v. The Howard Mutual Building Association of Balto., 36 Md. 383 (1872);
Robertson v. Am. Homestead Asso., 10 Md. 397 (1857).
See supra, n. 75.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ironic contrast to the situation which had prevailed in the
early days of its operation. Then, the accumulation of
the fund out of which advances were made to members was
frustratingly slow. And, after a member received an ad-
vance, the process of accumulating a new fund began all
over. This had the effect, as already seen, of justifying the
charge of a "premium" to the borrowing member 82 - in
addition to an entrance fee, interest, and any bonus which
might be necessary.
Critics viewed the elimination of the impasse which
the bonus eventually created as the primary objective of
reform.83 Legal minds in the United States furnished two
solutions - the Serial plan and the Permanent (or Per-
petual) plan - and the Maryland legislature attempted
the adoption of a British remedy - the "non-participat-
ing" plan. 4
Serial Associations
Under the Serial plan, a new "series" of terminating
stock was issued at the beginning of each fiscal year, or
half-yearly. 5 Since a member entering an association could
join the most recent series or wait until the issuance of a
new one, the problem of bonus was reduced to a negligible
quantity; and basis was provided for steady growth dur-
ing the entire life of the corporation. The system was
popular in some States," but by 1893 only 8 of the associa-
82 See pages 10-12, supra.
1 There was marked unconcern for the objections based upon the
premium and the uncertainty of the member's obligation. The emphasis in
the Ninth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor, "Building and
Loan Associations", H.R. Exwo. Doc. No. 209, 53d Cong. Sess. 22 (1894)
is typical of this single-mindedness:
"[T]he terminating plan . . . involves three serious defects which
it was desirable to obviate, namely, the dissolution of the association
when the stock matured; the large amount of back dues [i.e. bonus]
which the stockholder would have to pay who took stock after the
association had been running for some time, and, lastly, the making of
forced loans - that is, compelling the shareholder to become a bor-
rower whether he wanted to do so or not."8 There were two other forms of association, the Bowkett and the
Starr-Bowkett plans. These were based upon rather esoteric economic prin-
ciples and were never adopted in the United States. DAVIs, BENEFIT BUILD-
ING SOCIETIES (1887) pp. 28-35; ENDLICH, BUILDING ASSOCIATIONS (1882)
§§ 44-45; SUNDHEIM, LAW OF BUILING & LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (3d ed. 193X-)
§ 16; THOMPSON, BUILDING ASSOCIATIONS (2d ed. 1899) § 7 (1st ed. 1892)
§§ 21-22; THORNTON & BLACKLEDGE, BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
(1898) §§ 11-12; WURTZBURO, BUILDING SOCIETIES (5th ed. 1920) p. 3.
8 For a discussion of the Serial plan see the works referred to in the
preceding footnote, as follows; ENDLICH (2d ed.) § 24, (1st ed.) §§ 4749;
SUNDHEaM, § 12; THomPsoN (2d ed.) §§ 6, 8, (1st ed.) pp. 5-7; THORNTON
& BLACKLEDGE, § 8.
8 Among the eight states having the largest number of building and
loan associations in 1893, in four of them - Illinois (96.9%) ; Pennsyl-
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tions in Maryland were of this type; 7 and there is little
more than passing reference to the existence of the plan in
the decisions of the Court of Appeals, although a research
report of the Legislative Council in 1940 suggests that
this type of association "is still the predominant plan on
the Eastern Shore of Maryland. '8 s The dearth of judicial
consideration and the almost exact similarity to the Termi-
nating association render further attention to this solution
unnecessary.
Permanent Associations
The solution adopted in Maryland, and elsewhere, pre-
sented a more radical departure from the Terminating
plan. 9 Where the Serial plan involved nothing more than
a number of Terminating plans operating within the frame-
work of a single corporate charter, in which all members
of the same "series" had a common termination date, each
individual member of the Permanent association had a
separate termination date. Since the plan depended in no
way upon equality of relationship among the members, the
bonus was completely eliminated." The two plans were
"contra-distinguished" in an early Maryland case:
"[The terminating association] . . . was to cease to
exist, when it should have sufficient funds on hand to
vania (65.3%); New Jersey (87.5%); and Missouri (68.9%) - the
Serial plan was the dominant form of association. Nationally, the Serial
plan was used by 30.4% of all associations. Report of the Oommissioner
of Labor, op. cit. 8upra, n. 83, 14-15, 280.
'Report of the Commissioner of Labor, op. cit. supra, n. 83, pp. 14-15,
118-124, 260.
11C. Keating Bowie, Jr., "Building and Loan Associations," Research
Division, Maryland Legislative Council, Research Report No. 9 (1940) p. 3.
In 1923, it was indicated that a "recent survey" had revealed only 6 Serial
associations. Lakeview Building and Loan Assn. v. Beyer, 4 Balto. City
Reports 177, 179 (1923).
10The reasons for this split of preference are not entirely clear. Al-
though some writers [esp. THOMPSON, BUnING AND LoAN AssociAroNs
(2d ed. 1899) § 9] saw defects in the Permanent plan, most writers
viewed both plans as at least equally acceptable. Probably a strong
reason for the adoption of the Permanent plan in Maryland was that,
prior to 1894, it was more easily adapted 'to the existing statutes.
Some distinction in terms is necessary at this point. As noted here-
after, the Permanent plan as it existed in the United States was some-
what different from its British form. As used herein, the "permanent
plan" refers to the form adopted here. Also, the words "Permanent"
and "Perpetual" were sometimes used interchangeably to describe the
American form of association. Because the use of the latter word in
present law [e.g., 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 9 (a) (1)] might tend to
carry a connotation applicable to all corporations, the word "Permanent"
has been uniformly adopted throughout.
go The bonus was present in some degree in the Serial association in
the case of a member who entered the association in the interval between
the issuance of series.
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pay the holders of every unredeemed share of its
stock [the par value of their shares] ... , clear of all
losses and liabilities; and the stipulation in the mort-
gage was for the payment of weekly dues, and interest
on the sum advanced until the time mentioned should
arrive when the association should cease to exist.
[A Permanent association] ... is not to terminate, but
the contract of the mortgagor is to end and his obliga-
tion to pay is to cease, and his mortgage to be released
so soon as the amount paid by him as ... dues, together
with profits on his redeemed stock shall amount to the
sum advanced to him. Notwithstanding the redemp-
tion of ... his stock, [a borrowing member] ... con-
tinued to be a member of the association, entitled to
share in its profits, and to receive dividends upon the
shares so redeemed, in the same manner as if no ad-
vance had been made thereon." 91
This termination of membership applied alike to the
borrowing and non-borrowing member. In the case of each,
when dues and dividends increased all shares which had
been subscribed by a member to their par value, his in-
terest terminated. The borrowing member would receive
a release of his mortgage; and the free shareholder the
return of his dues, together with credited dividends.
The General Incorporation Act of 1868
In view of the provision in the Act of 1852 which limited
a building and loan association to the issuance of no more
than 1,000 shares of stock, 2 it was probably not possible,
as a practical matter,93 to establish a serial or permanent
association in Maryland prior to 1868. In that year, the
legislature passed the State's first General Incorporation
Act,94 which brought together a variety of "classes"95 of
corporations which had theretofore been authorized under
I'Border State Perp. Build. Assoc. v. McCarthy, 57 Md. 555, 560 (1882).
For other descriptions see, ENDLICH, BUILDING AsSOCIATIONS (2d ed. 1895)§ 23 (1st ed. 1882) § 46; SUNDHEIM, BUILDING AND LOAN AsSOCIATONS
(3d ed. 1933) § 13; THOMPSON, BUILDING AssOcIATIONs (2d ed. 1899) § 9:
THORNTON AND BLACKLEDGE, BUILDING AND LOAN AsSOCIATIONS (1898) § 9.
I2MD. LAWS 1852, Ch. 148, §3.
Cf. Lord v. Essex Build. Ass'n, 37 Md. 320, 326 (1873).
MD. LAws 1868, Ch. 471.
'Building and Loan associations were comprehended within § 18 of
the General Incorporation Act:
"Class 5. For the formation of homestead or building associations,
or associations for the loan of money on real or personal property
.. .provided that the property owned or acquired by such corpora-
tion is located in this State ...."
So much of the Act of 1852 as was retained was placed in §§ 84-91
of the Act of 1868.
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separate acts. Generally speaking, the Act made uniform
the provisions relating to the mechanics of incorporation
and corporate powers and government and "define[d] the
general powers of the corporations, created under this law,
and prescribe[d] the general regulations thereof, except
in the cases, where there may be special provisions, appli-
cable to particular corporations."9 6 Although the effect of
this statute upon building and loan associations became
second in importance only to the original Act of 1852, the
only perceptible difference, and even the significance of
that was perhaps unrecognized, was the removal of the
1,000-share limitation."
There was also a cryptic provision inserted in the
general law after the sections relating to building and loan
associations:
"That such of the provisions of the foregoing Sec-
tions, [i.e., the Act of 1852] as shall be found applicable
to corporations which may be formed in this State, for
the purpose of loaning money on real or personal prop-
erty, shall be held to apply to said corporations."98
Exactly what sort of Eutopian creature this language en-
visioned was not clear. 9 The words themselves invited a
good deal of picking and choosing among the building and
loan sections to find what provisions would be "found appli-
cable" to this other type of corporation. Viewed in a favor-
able light, the statute might represent nothing more than
an attempt to provide the means for overcoming the diffi-
culties of the Terminating associations; but there is more
than a touch of avarice. Whatever the meaning, the lan-
guage was clumsy; and fortunately, the statute was short-
lived.
"Davis v. West Saratoga Bldg. Union, 32 Md. 285, 294 (1870). See
also, BRUNE, MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE (Rev. ed. 1953)
§§ 6, 13.
The statute failed to provide for at least one feature of the building
and loan operation. MD. LAws 1868, Ch. 471, § 59, required all stock sub-
scriptions to be paid in full within two years. Cf. Frank v. Morrison, 55
Md. 399 (1881) ; Musgrave v. Morrison, 54 Md. 161 (1880) ; Morrison v.
Dorsey, 48 Md. 461 (1878). See also, MD. LAWS 1872, Ch. 203.
MD. LAWS 1868, Ch. 471, § 92.
"The Legislature had created a similar type of corporation by special act.
E.g., MD. LAws 1867, Ch. 358: Balto. Perm. B. & L. Soc. v. Taylor, 41
Md. 409 (1875); MD. LAWS 1868, Ch. 427: Birmingham v. Md. HOme-
stead Asso., 45 Md. 541 (1877); MD. LAwS 1868, Ch. 255: Montl.
Perm. Build. Soc. v. Lewin, 38 Md. 445 (1873). Compare with the associa-
tions formed under the General Incorporation Act. Williar v. Loan Ass'n,
45 Md. 546 (1877); Pentz v. Citizens' Fire Ins. etc. Co., 35 Md. 73 (1872).
It might well have been intended to obviate potential objections to such
restricted conferral of benefits [e.g. Birmingham v. Md. Homestead Asso..




In 1872, the Legislature repealed this provision and
enacted what is now 2 MD. CODE (1957) Article 23, §154.
The intention was now crystal-clear: "The provisions of
the [Act of 1852] . . . shall be taken and held to apply
to corporations which have been or may hereafter be
formed . . . for the purpose of loaning money on real or
personal property or for buying, selling, leasing or other-
wise dealing in land ....
The approach of the Act of 1872 was to fashion a new
corporate creature along the lines of the "Permanent asso-
ciation" as it had existed in Great Britain since 1846.101
These "non-participating associations," as they came to be
called, 10 2 were given express power to enforce the pay-
ment of dues, interest, premiums and fines; and similar
power with reference to entrance fees and bonuses could
undoubtedly be implied from the mandatory interpolation
of the provisions of the building and loan statutes.
The basic transaction with the borrowing member as
described by the statute was similar to that of the Termi-
nating association:
"[I]t shall and may be lawful for any of the corpora-
tions mentioned in this section ... to redeem or pur-
chase [the shares of a member] . . . at a sum or price,
as such member may agree to receive therefor, or to
loan to such member the par value of its shares ...
then to receive from such member . . . security by
way of mortgage on real or personal property, or
by the hypothecation of unredeemed shares of its stock
so sold by such member, and that said mortgage or
hypothecation shall be conditioned for the repayment
... of the money loaned or advanced to him in weekly
installments, including dues, legal interest on the
money so advanced or loaned . . . and also all fines,
assessments and penalties incurred according to the
by-laws . ,,103
Four other features of the Act were, however, quite novel.
1 0 MD. LAws 1872, Ch. 178. There was possibly some historical basis for
such an amalgamation of purposes in the history of building and loan
associations. Cf. DAVIS, BENEFIT BUYLDING SOCIETIES (1887) pp. 25-27;
STONE, BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETIES (1851) pp. 8-11).
101 DAVIs, op. cit. supra, n. 100, pp. 20-24; SCRATCHLEY, BENEFIT BUILDING
SOCIETIES (4th ed. 1868) pp. 34-40; STONE, op. cit. supra, n. 100, pp. 12-17.102 O'Sullivan v. Traders' Assn., 107 Md. 55, 60, 68 A. 349 (1907).
"S MD. LAWS 1872, Ch. 178.
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1. Paid-up or prepaid stock.
To accelerate and give added stability to the process of
accumulating the fund available to those who wished to
receive money from the corporation, the law permitted
these corporations to "provide for the payment of all or
any part of their stock in advance .. ."01 It is question-
able whether such specific provision was necessary after
the passage of the General Incorporation Act."°5
2. Perpetual existence.
Even under the Permanent plan, associations were
faced with the necessity of at least authorizing a new issue
of stock after all shares had been subscribed by borrowing
and non-borrowing members. The Act of 1872 offered par-
tial solution by making the corporation's entire capitaliza-
tion consist of only unredeemed shares:
"[S]hares of stock.., redeemed, advanced or loaned
or purchased . . . shall be considered as redeemed
shares and shall be cancelled: and it shall be lawful
for such corporation to issue an equal number of new
shares in their stead, so that the number of unre-
deemed shares may always equal and never exceed the
number of shares fixed by the certificate of incor-
poration .... "106
3. Termination of membership.
If there was any doubt about the status of a borrowing
member after his shares had been "cancelled" in accord-
ance with the above provisions, such was dispelled by pro-
vision that the corporation was
".... to receive from such member a transfer of all his
or her interest in such share or shares of its stock,...
and the member or members of such corporation, so re-
deeming their said share or shares of stock, shall cease
to be stockholders, and shall not be entitled to vote at
any meeting of such corporations, held for the pur-
IN Ibid.
The provisions of the General Incorporation Act, into which the Act
of 1872 was incorporated, contemplated the prompt payment for all
stock. Cf. supra, n. 97.
"' MD. LAWS 1872, Ch. 178. Since all shares of a building association were
"redeemable", there was some question about whether such shares could
be re-issued. BRUNE, MARYLAND CoRPoRATioN LAW AND PRAcTIcE (Rev. ed.
1953) § 49, pp. 53-54. Cf., 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 33 (a). See the
ultimate solution reached with regard to Building and Loan Associations
by MD. LAWS 1951, Ch. 361, now 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 144 (a).
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pose of electing directors or for any other purpose,
and shall not be eligible for any of the offices of the
corporation. '"107
4. Premium.
It had been argued without success that the original
statute contemplated either the addition of a sum to the
par value of the shares of a borrowing member or the pur-
chase of his shares at a discount from their par value.108
The Act of 1872 flatly authorized the corporation "[a] to
deduct such premium or bonus [as may be agreed upon]
in advance or [b] to make the same payable with and as
part of the weekly dues in each week.. .;" and the mort-
gage could also secure the repayment of "the weekly
premium agreed upon for each share.... -1
Failure of the Non-Participating Associations
The Act of 1872 never purported to deal with "building
and loan associations" eo nomine. 10 The Court of Appeals
stated on many occasions that it referred to an entirely
different class of corporation;"' but this was not strictly
accurate, since the legislature placed the non-participating
associations in the same class as building associations. 1 2
Judge Markell, for the Court, has noted that the statute "in
effect duplicates and also expands the Act of 1852, . . .";118
and it is conceivable that the Legislature saw little signifi-
cance in severing the ephemeral relationship between the
borrowing shareholder and the association." 4 The matter
was viewed as without legal significance in Britain:
"The borrowers, of course, are not entitled to par-
ticipate in the Surplus-Bonus, as they have secured the
equivalent by the manner in which they obtained their
advances. This point appears, since the publication
of the first Edition of our Treatise, to have been mis-
10 MD. LAWS 1872, Ch. 178.
10 See pages 11-12, supra.
10 MD. LAWS 1872, Ch. 178.
11o See 8upra, n. 100.
m Cf. Williar v. Loan Ass'n., 45 Md. 546, 562 (1877); Birmingham v.
Md. Homestead Asso., 45 Md. 541, 545 (1877).
2 See 8upra, n. 95.
n$Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, 186 Md. 569, 578, 47 A. 2d 769
(1946).
114 Cf. Washington Bldg. Assn. v. Andrews, 95 Md. 696, 53 A. 573 (1902),
where the Court of Appeals treated the corporation there involved as a
building and loan association, even though the borrower surrendered all
of his interest in the shares but apparently did receive a portion of the
profits.
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understood, and several well disposed persons have
exclaimed against an apparent disadvantage offered to
borrowers by the new system. They should, however,
have reflected that the borrower is in all cases, prac-
tically, equally well off, since by the very mode in
which he obtains his loan, he secures at once the en-
joyment of an immediate profit which is still only
prospective to the investor. The money in hand is of
at least as much advantage to the borrower as the de-
ferred realisation of his shares can be to the subscriber,
who has to wait to the end of his membership. So
strong a notion, however, appears to prevail in some
places, that a plan of so-called 'mutuality,' by which
Borrowers should participate with Investors in the
profits and the losses of the society, is preferable, that,
on the ground of expediency, we have in some cases
recommended the adoption of a 'mutual' plan."
115
The Maryland Court of Appeals, however, adopted this
"notion" as a rule of law.
In Williar v. Loan Ass'n,"86 a mortgage recited, inter
alia, that the mortgagor had received an advance of $3300
on eleven shares of $300 par value stock of the mortgagee;
that he promised to repay such advance with interest
thereon in 300 installments; and that he "released to the
mortgagee all his interest in, and the shares hereby re-
deemed, and to all profits that may be hereafter made by
the mortgagee." It otherwise appeared that a premium of
$275 had been deducted from the amount actually received
by the borrower - with the result that he was paying
installments consisting of repayment of principal and
premium, with interest on both. The Court held that:
"[The provisions of the Act of 1852] have no applica-
tion to a corporation like the appellee, nor to such a
transaction as the one under consideration, which was
nothing more nor less than a loan of money by the
association to the appellant, and a mortgage of his
property for its repayment with usurious interest.
The fact that he became a shareholder and the money
advanced to him is called a redemption of his shares,
makes no difference; he subscribed for the shares in
order to borrow the money, and immediately trans-
ferred or released them to the association, and ceased
135 SCRATCHLEY, BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETIES (4th ed. 1868) § 60. It fur-
ther appears that some British societies shared profits with the bor-
rowers for competitive reasons. DAVIS, BENEFIT 'BUILDING SocIrETIS
(1887) P. 22.
3645 Md. 54, 561 (1877).
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to have any further interest in the assets or funds of
the corporation.""' 7
Although the corporation argued that the Act of 1872
applied to the transaction,1 s and the case was decided well
after its passage, the Court did not expressly consider the
effect of that statute. In this posture, the Williar decision
stood only for the simple proposition that where the bor-
rower had no interest in the corporation after an "advance"
was made to him, the factors which made the transaction
"not one in which money is loaned" 119 did not exist; and
there was therefore nothing upon which the original Act
of 1852 could operate.
The matter was laid to rest in Citizens Security & L.
Co. v. Uhler, '2 where the Court viewed the Act of 1872
as an attempt to "authorize a certain class of corporations
to loan money at a higher rate of interest than is allowed
by the Constitution and general law of the State." A ma-
jority of the judges branded this "special class legislation"
and held that "in the absence of plain language, showing
such to be the intention, we are not to presume that
either the framers of the Constitution, or the people who
adopted it meant to confer a power so extraordinary on
the Legislature. '121
Judges Alvey and Stewart dissented on the ground that
the Legislature did have such power;122 but, there was no
disagreement with the premise that the transaction was,
in fact, a "loan." As explained by the majority:
"[A]lthough the mortgagor [in a non-participating
association] becomes in a certain sense a shareholder,
that is, he subscribes for a certain number of shares,
yet immediately on borrowing the money, he executes
a mortgage releasing or transferring to the company
his shares of stock, and thereby ceases to have any in-
terest in the profits earned by the corporation. Such




Supra, n. 116, 554.
"9 Supra, n. 116, 562. Compare Lakeview Building and Loan Assn. v.
Beyer, 4 Balto. City Reports 177 (1923).
"48 Md. 455, 459 (1878).
"Id., 459-460. See also, MD. CONST. Art. III, § 57. A similar result
had been indicated with regard to an association created by special act;
Birmingham v. Md. Homestead Asso., 45 Md. 541, 543 (1877). The holding
in the Uhler case must not be read without a simultaneous consideration
of Carozza v. Federal Finance Co., 149 Md. 223, 244-250, 131 A. 332 (19-5).
Supra, n. 120, 460.
Supra, n. 120, 459.
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With these decisions, the first of two attempts to change
the basic character of the building and loan industry came
to an end.124 The benefits of building and loan associations
were born of mutuality; and if any corporation wished to
reap these benefits, it must provide some form of this
ingredient.
The Rise of the Permanent Association
The failure of the non-participating associations (or,
more properly, the British form of Permanent association)
cast some doubt upon the other means which had been
developed to overcome the difficulties of the Terminating
plan. The Court of Appeals soon held, however, that the
Permanent form as developed in the United States did not
so vary the early principles as to change the basis upon
which the benefits of a building and loan association trans-
action rested:
"[The borrowing member of the Permanent asso-
ciation] . . .after the advance was made to him, con-
tinued to have a joint interest in the association, this
constitutes the mutuality between the members hold-
ing redeemed and unredeemed shares; and it can make
no difference in principle whether the society is to
terminate . . .or is a permanent association, and the
contract of the mortgagor is to end, and his connection
with the society to terminate, when the amount paid
by him as . . .dues, and his share of the profits shall
equal the sum advanced to him."'25
The day had not yet come when many corporations
which desired to operate in the area formerly occupied by
the Terminating associations would wish to abandon the
high return of the building and loan transaction for that
of the non-participating association. With this sanction by
the courts, corporations based upon the Permanent plan
grew in great profusion. A composite picture of the indus-
try in Maryland at the close of the century can be gathered
32 With the exceptions noted in Part IV, infra, pp. 111-112, no other cases
have been found which purport to deal with non-participating associa-
tions. Amendments were made to the Act of 1872 by MD. LAWS 1904,
Ch. 239 (to include corporations formed "under the provisions of any acts
of Assembly" and add the words "or borrower" as they now appear in the
fifteenth line of the present [2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 154] codifica-
tion) and by MD. LAWS 1935, Ch. 233 (by adding the words "biweekly or
monthly" and "participating or nonparticipating" as they now appear).
Building Association v. McCarthy, 57 Md. 555, 561 (1882). The hold-
ing was reaffirmed in Stewart v. Building Association, 106 Md. 675, 68 A.
887 (1907) and again in O'Sullivan v. Traders' Assn., 107 Md. 55, 68
A. 349 (1907). See also, Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, 186 Md.
569, 47 A. 2d 68 (1946). Compare the argument in Balto. Perm. B. & L.
Soc. v. Taylor, 41 Md. 409, 415 (1875).
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from the voluminous Ninth Annual Report of the Com-
missioner of Labor, "Building and Loan Associations," pub-
lished in 1894.126
At that time, there were 240 corporations in Maryland
which styled themselves building and loan associations
with total assets of nearly twelve and a half million
dollars,'12 7 89.2% of which were of the Permanent type.128
In 31 of the associations surveyed, 19.21% of the members
were "artisans and mechanics"; 171% laborers; 15.62% mer-
chants and dealers; and 14.22% housewives.' 9 213 of the
associations operated on a weekly basis,130 with 198 charg-
ing weekly dues of 25¢ per share.'1' 143 had stock with a
par value of $100, and 40 had $130 par value stock." 2 All
but 63 of the 183 associations questioned on the point in-
dicated that they allowed only one vote per member, the
others determining voting rights on the basis of shares.3
Fifteen associations took money on deposit.3 4 121 associa-
tions reported yearly income from dues and profits to be
under $25,000; and another 56 received less than $50,000.1s
Most associations had made no "hypothecation" advances. 13
Few had advanced more than $25,000.137 An overwhelming
majority (152) of the State's associations reported their
transactions to be of the following nature:
"[T]here is no auction of money or bidding for loans.
Loans are usually awarded to members in the order
of their applications by lot. The borrower makes his
regular payment of dues and interest on his loan until
the shares pledged for such loan have reached matur-
ing value, unless the loan is previously settled; or the
number and amount of his payments are fixed by the
rules of the association."'18
Only 25 associations still charged a premium. 3 9
[To be continued in the next issue, p. 91.]
Ninth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor, "Building and
Loan Associations", H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 209, 53d Cong. Sess. 22 (1894).
-Id., 318.
Supra, n. 126, 14-15, 118-126, 281. Maryland was second only to Ohio
in the percentage of Permanent associations.
m-' Supra, n. 126, 321.
' Supra, n. 126, 349.
Supra, n. 126, 352.19 Supra, n. 126, 356.
Supra, n. 126, 361.
' Supra, n. 126, 383. Presumably these associations were incorporated
under special act. Cf. National Bank v. Crockett, 145 Md. 435, 125 A. 712
(1924).
1 Supra, n. 126, 314-315.
"3 Supra, n. 126, 310-311.
' Supra, n. 126, 302-303.
1 Supra, n. 126, 391.
Supra, n. 126, 38-391.
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